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Livable Housing Design: Who is responsible? 
 
Abstract: Current housing design and construction practices do not meet the needs of many people 
with disability and older people, and limits their inclusion and participation in community and family 
life.  In spite of a decade of advocacy for regulation of access within residential environments, the 
Australian government has opted for a voluntary approach where the housing industry takes 
responsibility.  Housing industry leaders have indicated that they are willing to transform their 
established practice, if it makes good business to do so, and if there is a demand from home buyers. 
To date, there has been minimal demand.   
 
In 2010, housing industry and community leaders formalised this commitment in an agreement, called 
Livable Housing Design, to transform housing design and construction practices, with a target of all 
new housing providing minimal access by 2020.  This paper reports on a study which examined the 
assumption behind Livable Housing Design agreement; that is, individuals in the housing industry will 
respond voluntarily and take responsibility for the provision of inclusive housing.   
 
From interviews with developers, designers and builders in Brisbane, Queensland, the study found a 
complex picture of competing demands and responsibilities.  Instead of changing their design and 
construction practices voluntarily to meet the future needs of users over the life of housing, they are 
more likely to focus on their immediate contractual obligations and to maintain the status quo.  
Contrary to the view of the government and industry leaders, participants identified that an external 
regulatory framework would be required if Livable Housing Design’s 2020 goal was to be met.  
 
Introduction 
The Australian housing industry typically does not consider that inclusive design is a priorit y for the 
buying-market (Beer & Faulkner, 2008, p. 51; Karol, 2008). As a result, residential spaces largely 
remain physically inaccessible; this is contrary to public spaces and places, which are now required to 
provide non-discriminatory access (Australian Government, 2010a).  For over a decade, advocates 
for inclusive residential environments have called for minimum access features to be included in the 
National Construction Code for all new and extensively modified housing (Herd, Ward, & Seeger 
2003)—without success. National policy obligations towards more liveable cities (Australian 
Government, 2011b), human rights for people with disability (Australian Government, 2011a) and 
greater social inclusion (Australian Government, 2010b) catalysed industry and community leaders in 
2010 to agree on a national voluntary access guideline for inclusive housing, called Livable Housing 
Design (NDUHD, 2010a), and a plan (NDUHD, 2010b) to transform these practices, with a target of 
minimum access features in all new housing by 2020. The plan relies on the assumption that the 
housing industry will take responsibility for its transformation to more inclusive practices.   
 
This paper reports on a study that problematised this assumption. The study explored the agency 
within the housing industry in providing inclusive housing. It attempted to “stand in the shoes” of 
developers, designers and builders to understand what the Livable Housing Design agreement and 
the 2020 target meant for them within their current practice. Within the limits of the study, the paper 
suggests the assumption is flawed. The complex and competing demands placed on individual agents 
in a highly competitive and variable market (Dalton, Wakefield, & Horne, 2011, p. 7) made the change 
required to provide inclusive housing voluntarily difficult. The paper also suggests that, if the 2020 
target of the Livable Housing Design agreement is to be reached, a higher regulatory authority will 
need to take the responsibility for the provision of inclusive housing, preceded by demonstration, 
education and industry leadership to prepare the way.  
 
The paper uses the term “inclusive housing” to describe mainstream social or private housing , 
designed and built to facilitate the participation in everyday domestic life in regular neighbourhoods 
(Milner & Madigan, 2004). In real terms it refers to a minimum level of access or “visitable” access.  
Visitability has three fundamentals: basic physical access to and within a dwelling should be a right, 
not a privilege; this access can be provided through good design at minimal cost; and giving priority to 
the most important features should make it doable and reasonable within current practice (Maisel, 
2006). The Livable Housing Design agreement interpreted visitability as the “Si lver Level”, which is 
described in Appendix 1.   
 
The preliminary findings from this study suggest that there are similarities to the experience of 
voluntary approaches in the United Kingdom (Imrie, 2006, pp. 45-67) and United States of America 
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(Nishita, Liebig, Pynoos, Perelman, & Spegal, 2007) and that, based on these experiences, the 
Livable Housing Design agreement is unlikely to work (Ward, Franz, & Adkins, 2011).  This paper 
reports on the completed study and begins with an exploration of the notions of agency and 
responsibility. It then situates the study within the current policy and practice for inclusive housing in 
Australia.  It describes the research method and the results of the study, and concludes with  a 
discussion which argues who will need to take responsibility for the provision of inclusive housing, if 
the 2020 target is to be reached.  
 
Agency and Responsibility  
The theory of agency explores what happens when one person or a group of people (agent) is 
contracted by another (principal) to act for them (Mitnick, 1998, p. 12).  The relationship between 
principal and agent is complex, and centres on the risk involved in this contract (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The principal often does not know when agents simply do not care, or the principal does not know if 
the agent can do the job that is required. So a range of risk-minimising strategies are used, from 
external regulation or arbitration by a higher authority with prescribed standards to reliance on an 
informed and knowledgeable principal. This idea of agency was useful for this study to understand the 
agency of actors in the housing industry either as individuals or as a group in providing inclusive 
housing voluntarily, and how they considered their responsibility in relation to minimising risk.  
 
Responsibility can be thought of as either moral or attributable to a belief or cause, or substantive, in 
the sense that one does what is required in their job or their role (Scanlon, 1998, p. 248).  With the 
type of responsibility is also the idea of levels of responsibility  (Williams, 1990). Williams considers the 
highest level of responsibility is when agents consider they freely deliberate and take voluntary action 
in the full sense of the term, thereby ideally taking full responsibility for their actions. The second level 
is when agents take responsibility for their actions, in the sense of being able to accommodate their 
actions to given requirements. The third level is when agents take no responsibility for the final 
outcome of their actions. Williams than suggests agents tend to adjust to the appropriate level of 
responsibility required for their roles, so they can work effectively together.  With this in mind, the 
paper now turns to who within the Australian context might take responsibility. 
 
Current transfer of responsibility 
In Australia, four key stakeholders affect the supply of inclusive housing: governing authorities; people 
who need inclusive housing; buyers of new housing; and the housing industry.  With regard to 
governing authorities, the National Construction Code (NCC), Australia’s overarching construction 
regulation body, has no requirement for access—much less visitability—in detached housing and in 
the private areas of multi-dwelling developments (Australian Building Codes Board, 2013). Some 
governing authorities have acted through funding agreements, additions to the NCC, and planning 
codes to encourage a supply of some inclusive housing (Australian Government, 2009; Landcom, 
2008; Urban Land Development Authority, 2011). The South Australian and the ACT Governments 
have amended their building legislation to mandate visitability in a small number of dwellings within 
larger complexes (ACT Government, 2013; Government of South Australia, 2002) and many local 
governments have attempted to incentivise the supply of inclusive housing (Newman, 2010). As well, 
various funding and policy requirements for social housing include some provisions for visitability, 
even full access in new construction.  The result is a complex array of regulations, incentives and 
guidelines, denying the housing industry the consistency and reliability that mandated regulation 
provides (Productivity Commission, 2004, p. 37).  In effect, the Australian Government has handed 
the responsibility for the supply of inclusive housing to the housing industry and market -demand.   
 
The housing industry leaders support this position. Although they acknowledge that nationally 
consistent regulations are critical to the efficient production of housing for both the provider and the 
buyer (Productivity Commission, 2004, p. 78), they are reluctant to accept regulation for inclusive 
housing (Housing Industry Association, 2011). There is simply not enough demand at the point of 
sale.  The literature supports this perception.  People who need the access features outlined in the 
Livable Housing Design guidelines are the least likely to buy new housing (Beer & Faulkner, 2008; de 
Jonge, Jones, Phillips, & Chung, 2011), and the majority of the buying-market is disinterested in 
purchasing additional features which they do not envision they need (Crabtree & Hes, 2009; 
Spanbroek & Karol, 2006).   
 
Those who are adversely affected by the lack of accessible housing are currently calling on the 
Australian Government to mandate a provision of minimum access features through the National 
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Construction Code (Australian Network for Universal Housing Design, 2011; Civil Society Project 
Group, 2012).  Although both the ACT and Victorian Governments have attempted to make additions 
to the NCC, this has been discouraged by industry leaders (Housing Industry Association, 2010).  
 
The outcome is a circular transfer of responsibility where governments, the housing industry and 
buyers each act independently to provide some inclusive housing, with the ultimate responsibility for a 
consistent and reliable supply sitting with no-one (See Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Circular transfer of responsibility . 
 
The Livable Housing Design agreement aims to halt this circular transfer of responsibility by assuming 
that, in the place of mandated regulation, the housing industry would accept responsibility for 
improving the supply of inclusive housing, use a national voluntary guideline, with the target of 
providing minimum features in all new housing by 2020.  The Livable Housing Design initiative 
consider this will happen with the assistance of incentives to increase the demand for inclusive-
housing by buyers, promotion and recognition of industry leadership, and acceptance of the guideline 
and targets as part of government public policy (NDUHD, 2010b, pp. 5-6).  
 
Method 
The study took place in and around Brisbane, Australia. It used eleven newly -constructed mainstream 
dwellings as a theoretical sample of various housing types and contexts (See Figure 2); that is, Class 
1 (single family dwellings) and Class 2 (multi-dwelling complexes), and a mix of social, private and 
state-managed developments. Each context had different imperatives for and experiences in 
providing inclusive housing. The social-housing providers, that being the Queensland Government’s 
public-housing authority and community-housing organisations, were required to provide some 
access features in their housing in accordance with their individual policies. There was no 
requirement, either through legislation or funding agreements, to provide access features in the 
private developments. Queensland Government’s Urban Land Development Authority (ULDA) 
required at least 10% of the housing built within their Urban Development Areas to comply with its 
accessible housing guideline (Urban Land Development Authority, 2009). 
 




Figure 2. Description of dwellings in housing contexts. 
 
The study gathered data from twenty-eight semi-structured interviews of developers, designers, site 
representatives and contracted builders involved with the construction of the dwellings, site visits and 
inspection of contract documents.  The study took a theoretical perspective of critical inquiry using 
immanent critique; thereby “testing” the logic of an initiative (in this case, the Livable Housing Design 
initiative) by drawing on resources internal to it (Sabia, 2010).  
 
The study first analysed the substantive data. Then, it took an ethnomethodological approach, 
seeking to understand how the participants made sense of their everyday practices (Garfinkel, 1967, 
p. 11); here, how they made sense of their agency in, and responsibility for the provision of inclusive 
housing.  This paper reports on the findings of the latter.  The study used Dahler-Larsen’s (2001) 
constructivist approach to program theory as a guide for the structured interviews and site 
observations.  Dahler-Larsen argues that the individual agency of people can assist or inhibit a 
program or initiative, and intentional strategies can be developed to affect this agency.  The 
participants were busy people and, in the main, ambivalent towards the subject.  This guide allowed 
the study to collect and analyse the most useful data.  
 
Results 
The paper first reports on how participants made sense of their agency and the risk incurred by 
providing inclusive housing. It then describes their responsibility first for the people who need 
inclusive housing, and for providing inclusive housing voluntarily.  Finally, it describes their 
perceptions of responsibility for meeting the Livable Housing Design’s 2020 target.    
 
Agency and risk 
Nearly all the participants were willing to align with the agency of their “group” or “role” whether that 
be their company, their employer or their profession.  Some participants did express a personal 
opinion; however, most deferred to the opinion that was required in their role or job.  One developer 
explained: I think , in principle, it’s a great idea. . . . But, ah yeah . . . companies are out to make 
money. That's what they are supposed to be doing.  Only one participant was willing to express an 
opinion within his role knowing that it differed from that of his company: “I’m very passionate about 
[inclusive housing]. So you know—and I don’t care what people think  of me, if it’s wrong I make them 
fix it”.   
 
The participants fell into three broad groups with regard to the level of risk they identified in providing 
inclusive housing.  The first group (named “developers”) considered their purpose was to provide an 
optimal outcome for the financial investment, and identified a high risk in providing inclusive housing. 
One developer said: “Do we have a return on that investment? When we put a product on the market, 
can we make money out of it?”  The second group (named “designers”) considered their task was to 
interpret the developers’ directions into a building contract. They identified a medium -level of risk in 
providing inclusive housing. A designer said: “The challenge is investor stock —the cheap, get-it-up, 
get-it-out, sell-it-off-to-students—so-students-can-rent-it. That’s where it’s tricky”.  The third group 
(“named builders”) considered their purpose was  to comply with and complete the building contract. 
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They identified a low-level of risk in providing inclusive housing. A builder said: “Always, you follow 
what’s on the plans. If the design is drawn, you can make it happen”.   
 
The three groups each presented differently with regard to how they perceived their responsibility for 
inclusive housing.  The developers considered their task was to decide whether inclusive housing 
should be provided. For example, a developer said: “It’s k ind of hard to determine the exact number . . 
. you wouldn’t do them 100% as accessible. You would have to pick  a number”. The designers 
considered their task was to decide what was to be provided; that is, what inclusive housing meant.  A 
designer explained: “Personally, when I am designing, it’s always 1200[mm wide corridors]”.   The 
builders considered it their responsibility to decide how (or in what way) inclusive housing was 
constructed: “There’s no big deal—as long as you know you’re doing it beforehand” (See Figure 3).    
 
 
Figure 3. Levels of responsibility. 
Perceptions of responsibility in relation to people who need inclusive housing  
Participants perceived their responsibility for people who need inc lusive housing in two ways. Some 
were interested in this group because they were potential buyers; meeting their needs meant a 
business opportunity. Most participants, however, were not interested—they felt that the people who 
need inclusive housing were not their responsibility. The responsibility sat better with a higher 
authority, or “specialist” housing providers, such as, disability organisations, public housing, or 




Figure 4. Responsibility for people who need inclusive housing. 
 
Perceptions of responsibility in relation to providing inclusive housing  
The study then found that participants directed the responsibility for providing inclus ive 
housing in three directions: to the housing industry; to the buying-market; and to a higher authority 
(See Figure 5).   
 




Figure 5. Responsibility for the provision of inclusive housing. 
A few participants perceived the responsibility for providing inclusive housing should sit with the 
housing industry; they considered it to be good practice to make housing inclusive.  One designer 
said: “I would consider [the Silver Level] a minimum for any good design—any reasonable design, not 
any even good design—reasonable design”. The next group considered the responsibility sat with the 
buying-market; that is, if the buying-market needed it, it was their responsibility to ask for it. A 
developer explained: “It’s a consumer-driven thing”. The third group considered the responsibility sat 
with a higher authority to direct them on what was needed. A developer exemplified this by saying: 
“Unless it’s made compulsory, we would probably never go down that, that line”. 
 
Perceptions of responsibility for the 2020 target 
When the participants were asked to consider who was responsible for meeting the 2020 target, the 
emphasis changed. Participants were unanimous that this responsibility could not be handed over to 
the buying-market (See Figure 6).   
 
 
Figure 6. Responsibility for reaching the Livable Housing Design 2020 target.  
They considered buyers simply not informed enough, and too variable in their decision-making to 
expect that such a target could be met through buyer-demand. A developer explained how he 
thought buyers made decisions: “‘I want that door and I want that shower. I want that cool 
shower that sits in the middle of the bathroom’”.  
 
Most participants assigned responsibility for the 2020 target to a higher authority , with some assigning 
this responsibility immediately—this is how the industry typically works. A developer explained: 
“[Regulation] is the key to make [the industry] change [their practice]. Once they’ve changed it, it’s like 
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it’s the law of construction, basically. So that’s what has to happen”. Others considered a reluctant 
developmental approach, illustrated by one developer: “I don’t agree with regulation by the way 
(laugh) but I think  it’s the only way forward”. Others expressed their caution by identifying strategies 
that would assist industry acceptance. These included explanation of the task, demonstration that it 
was good business practice, and the larger companies taking the lead.   
 
Discussion 
The finding that participants typically considered their agency in terms of their professional role or job 
rather than an act of individual agency reflects their preference for taking substantive (rather than 
moral) responsibility (Scanlon, 1998, p. 248). It also indicated their roles were interdependent and 
relied on taking the level of responsibility appropriate to their role in relation to others (Williams, 1990). 
Bringolf (2011) gives specific insight into this behaviour in her study on the barriers to universal 
design. She argues that the housing industry risks a domino-style effect; if one agent changes his or 
her practice it “poses a risk to the whole group, such that they might all fall” (p. 281) providing little 
incentive for change.   
 
The three groups (developers, designers and builders) identified different levels of risk in their roles in 
providing inclusive housing, with developers incurring the highest level of risk. This suggests that if 
change is to happen voluntarily it would best be led by those taking the greatest risk and the most 
responsibility (developers), and the others (designers and builders) are likely to follow.  Participants’ 
attitudes towards people who need inclusive housing also indicated a preference for taking 
substantive responsibility; that is, they were willing to provide inclusive housing if it resulted in a 
business opportunity for them, or if they were directed (so everyone else was required to do so) 
resulting in a “level playing field” with no disadvantage for anyone.  In the absence of participants 
expressing a moral responsibility towards inclusive housing, the transfer of responsibility to “specialist 
housing providers” could be interpreted more as an explanation for the minimal demand by buyers 
than as a discriminatory, segregationist attitude towards this cohort.  One developer said: “So, um, the 
public housing sector do actually look after those people with specific -designed homes.  I know that 
because I have quoted on them”. 
 
Participants acknowledged three reasons for providing inclusive housing; good industry practice,  
market-demand, and direction from a higher authority. When participants considered the 2020 target, 
they dismissed the influence of buying-market, thereby acknowledging the current market-failure, and 
anticipating the limits of a voluntary approach without increased buyer-demand.  The 2020 target of 
the Livable Housing Design initiative sets a precedent—former voluntary codes have not set 
measurable anticipated outcomes.  This target focused the participants on what ultimately would 
work.  The buyer voice is absent in this study. Both Bringolf (2011, p. 266) and Thomas (2004) 
suggest, however, that buyers wanting particular access features must advocate strongly, and often 
must acquiesce to established housing practices rather than the reverse.  Further research on the 
agency of the buyers (and what would increase demand) would be useful.   
 
In handing the responsibility for the 2020 target over to a higher authority, the participants differed on 
the timing. They acknowledged that the industry relied on mandated regulation to set a minimum 
standard yet preferred to avoid any direction for as long as possible, before its inevitability. The 
suggested testing period would allow for the development of a clear, coherent national policy, a 
consultative process on what worked within current practice limitations, and better understanding of 
its purpose. The participants, in effect, called a halt in the circular t ransfer of responsibility for 
inclusive housing (See Figure 1) by placing it squarely in the hands of government (See Figure 7).   
 




Figure 7. Responsibility for reaching the Livable Housing Design 2020 target.  
By doing this they supported the position of the advocates for those most affected by the lack of 
inclusive housing. Their positions, however, come from different concepts of responsibil ity. While the 
advocates for inclusive communities call for a higher authority to take both moral (“inclusion is a 
human right”) and substantive (“it is cost-effective to keep people in their homes”) responsibility, most 
participants acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, the need for a higher authority to take substantive 
responsibility for what is acknowledged to be the most reliable and cost -effective strategy to provide 
inclusive housing (Imrie, 2006, p. 133; Productivity Commission, 2004, p. 37).   
 
Thus, the participants identified that the Livable Housing Design initiative had two purposes. First, it 
prepares the way for legislation by naming the extent of the task of providing inclusive housing, 
suggesting that the housing industry can improve its practices, and demonstrating that providing 
inclusive housing makes good business sense. Second, it encourages the housing industry to provide 
better than the minimum that would be required by law.     
 
So who will take responsibility for the provision of inclusive housing and for reaching the 2020 target? 
If the Livable Housing Design initiative ceased its efforts today, the housing industry would have little 
incentive to change its practice—it would be “business as usual”. Perhaps demand from the buying-
market might increase; though the literature on Australian buyer behaviour suggests this is unlikely in 
the near future (Crabtree & Hes, 2009; Spanbroek & Karol, 2006). Further research in this area would 
be useful. The changes in demography towards an older population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2010) and a preference to remain active and contributing in community life (Ozanne, 2009) may well 
influence buyers to demand inclusive design.    
 
Advocates for inclusive communities prefer that a higher authority take responsibility (People with 
Disability Australia, 2010, p. 37). This paper suggests the housing industry also prefers that a higher 
authority take responsibility, but for different reasons; to provide certainty in a highly competitive 
environment, when change is required of them. So the problem is not so much “who should take 
responsibility?”; rather, “how might this happen?”   
 
The impetus for change is more likely to come from those most affected by the lack of inclusive 
housing, who would identify the need for systemic change.  It has typically been thus because those 
most affected are the first to understand the injustice that has been done to them (in this case, 
exclusion), and to take action against it (Young, 2011, p. 92).  The advocates would thus do well to 
acknowledge within their arguments for social inclusion, the complex demands on the housing 
industry, the level of certainty they need, and the development process that they prefer, with any 
legislation.   
 




This paper reported on a study of the Australian housing industry and its response to providing 
inclusive housing voluntarily.  It problematised the assumption by the recent Livable Housing Design 
initiative that individual agents within the housing industry would take responsibil ity for the provision of 
inclusive housing.  Within the limitations of the study, the paper argues this assumption is flawed; a 
voluntary approach alone will not be adequate, and legislation will be necessary if the 2020 target was 
to be reached.  The study however found the intentional developmental approach of the Livable 
Housing Design initiative is an important precursor for the housing industry to accept this legislative 
approach.   
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1. Dwelling access 
There is a safe and continuous pathway from the street entrance and/or parking area to a 
dwelling entrance that is level.  
 
2. Dwelling entrance 
There is at least one level entrance into the dwelling to enable home occupants to easily enter 
and exit the dwelling. 
 
3. Car park ing (where part of the dwelling access) 
Where the parking space is part of the dwelling access it should allow a person to open their car 
doors fully and easily move around the vehicle. 
 
4. Internal doors and corridors 
Internal doors and corridors facilitate comfortable and unimpeded movement between spaces.  
 
5. Toilet 
The ground (or entry) level has a toilet to support easy access for home occupants and visitors.  
 
6. Shower 
The bathroom and shower is designed for easy and independent access for all home occupants.  
 
7. Reinforcement of bathroom and toilet walls 
The bathroom and toilet walls are built to enable grab rails to be safely and economically 
installed. 
 
8. Less than 5mm transition between internal spaces 
Internal doors and corridors facilitate comfortable and unimpeded movement between spaces.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 The Livable Housing Design guidelines were revised in 2012 to incorporate seven core features.   
